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PROFIT SHIFTING IN THE EU: 





The paper considers profit shifting behavior using data on German inbound and outbound 
FDI. It finds an empirical correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the 
net of tax profitability of its German affiliate that is consistent with profit shifting behavior. 
For profitable affiliates that are directly owned by a foreign investor the evidence suggests 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half 
a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German affiliate. On the outbound side 
of German FDI, the data provides some evidence that tax rate changes in the host country lead 
to a stronger change in after-tax profitability for affiliates that are wholly owned, which may 
reflect the larger flexibility of these firms in carrying out tax minimizing behavior without 
interference of minority owners. 
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1. Taxes and profit shifting 
Tax competition between countries may be conceived of in different ways. A 
common conception is that countries or regions employ tax instruments to attract or keep 
firms. But even without firm relocation a country may benefit from lowering taxes if this 
induces multinational firms to shift taxable profits to this country. Firms may achieve such 
income shifting by using prices for intra-company sales that depart from arms' length 
conditions, by agreeing on excessive management and overhead fees, by setting non-market 
interest rates within a group, etc. There are also limits to profit shifting behavior. 
Governments, in particular in high tax countries, may try to limit the allowable transfer 
pricing strategies and this may even lead to a double taxation.
1 In addition, firms themselves 
may find it difficult to set tax efficient prices if this leads to confusion in the accounts of 
profit centers and problems in the remuneration of managers (Caves 1982, pp. 246-7), or if 
minority shareholders resist.  
Starting in the early 1990s, a growing literature has tried to empirically identify tax 
motivated profit shifting.
2 So far, the studies have almost exclusively concentrated on U.S. 
data. The debate has been stirred by Wheeler (1988) und Dworin (1990) with the simple 
observation that foreign-owned subsidiaries in the U.S. have a smaller profitability than 
genuine U.S. firms. Grubert, Goodspeed und Swenson (1993) showed that at least 50% of 
the difference could be explained by the special characteristics of foreign-owned firms. For 
example, those firms on average are younger than domestic firms or may have special write-
offs following a foreign takeover. The authors suggest that the reminder of the difference in 
profitability is due to profit shifting activities.
3 Harris et al. (1993) analyze the profitability 
                                                 
1 Cf. Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1998), Elitzur and Mintz (1996), or Mansori and Weichenrieder (1999).  
2 Useful surveys on profit shifting and related aspects of international tax issues are contained in recent papers 
by De Mooji (2005) and Eggert/Haufler (2006).  
3 In an unpublished revision of Grubert, Goodspeed und Swenson (1993), Grubert (1997) found a considerably 
reduced difference between U.S. and foreign-owned firms.    3
of U.S. parent firms and find that parents with subsidiaries in low-tax countries have a 
significantly lower return than parents with high-tax affiliates, which is compatible with 
profit shifting activities. Grubert and Mutti (1991) use aggregated data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and find that profits on sales of U.S. subsidiaries are higher in low-tax 
countries than in high tax countries.
4 
One of the interesting empirical facts reported in Grubert, Goodspeed und Swenson 
(1993) was that in 1987, 37% of all non-financial foreign companies had a profitability in 
terms of total assets that was near to zero. Conversely, only 27% of the domestic firms fell 
into the same zero range from -2.5% to +2.5%. This issue is taken up in Collins, Kemsley 
and Shackelford (1997) who concentrate on a sample of foreign-owned and non foreign-
owned wholesale firms. Their working hypothesis is that if foreign-controlled firms (unlike 
domestic firms) target zero profitability, then an (exogenous) increase in sales should go 
along with a smaller increase in profitability compared to domestic firms. The reason is that, 
while higher sales per se are good for profits, foreign firms would counteract by charging 
higher prices on intra-firm trade. The findings of Collins, Kemsley and Shackleford do not 
support the view that foreign controlled firms have a significantly weaker correlation 
between sales and profits. Based on this observation the authors suggest that systematic 
differences between domestic and foreign firms rather than income shifting may be the 
reason for the near zero profitability of many foreign-controlled U.S. firms.
5  
Hines and Rice (1994) use 1982 country level data on U.S. affiliates. Their profit 
measure approximates earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The empirical results 
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the host country tax rate reduces reported 
EBIT of U.S. affiliates by some 3 percent. Finally, Huizinga and Laeven (2005) in a recent 
paper use a micro data set of European based subsidiaries. Like in Hines and Rice, they 
                                                 
4 U.S. studies using mostly smaller firm samples include Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993), Jacob (1996), 
Collins and Shackelford (1998), and Rousslang (1997)  
5 A recent study that uses a quite different approach is by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003). Instead of using 
specific data on multinationals, however, they consider aggregate industry data of OECD countries to detect 
tax effects on the size of value added.   4
consider a cross-section (1999) of firms and study the effect of tax differentials on reported 
EBIT. Their findings suggest that, while the estimated tax effect is considerably smaller than 
in Hines and Rice, profit shifting implies a significant revenue loss for high tax countries, 
Germany in particular.  
In this paper, I use the MiDi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank on German 
inbound and outbound FDI to empirically detect profit shifting. While the above discussion 
of the literature has made clear that there have been several attempts to empirically identify 
profit shifting behavior of multinationals, this paper is one of the first micro-based studies 
with non-U.S. data.  
While there are many potential influences on firm profitability, a first hypothesis is 
that the lower the tax rate of a foreign parent is vis a vis the rate that is applicable to its 
German affiliate, the more profitable it will be to shift the profits of the affiliate to the home 
country of the parent. Therefore the profitability of the German affiliate may be positively 
correlated with the home country tax rate. The paper also looks at the effects that the foreign 
tax rate has on the profitability of German subsidiaries abroad. A problem here is that the 
database of German FDI does only record net-of-tax profits of subsidiaries, which at a given 
pre-tax profitability automatically react negatively to a tax rate increase. Therefore the paper 
will formulate hypotheses how co-ownership of foreign subsidiaries may influence profit 
shifting. Under certain conditions the testable hypothesis can be formulated that tax rate 
changes have a more pronounced effect on wholly-owned subsidiaries as compared to non-
wholly owned ones.  
The strongest evidence for profit shifting behavior is found for inbound FDI. For 
profitable subsidiaries that are directly owned by a foreign investor the evidence suggests 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half 
a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German affiliate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a stylized 
model of profit shifting that will formulate testable hypotheses. Section 3 will briefly   5
introduce the data used in this paper before Section 4 will econometrically analyze German 
inbound FDI and Section 5 will look at German outbound investment. Section 6 concludes.  
2. A stylized model of profit shifting  
One characteristic of the MiDi database, which will be described in more detail in the 
next section, is that it collects net of tax profits, but no information on pre-tax profits. 
Another issue is that MiDi contains little information on the parent firms apart from 
information on their country of origin. In the light of these data limitations, the following 
model is set up to develop hypotheses about the observed subsidiaries that indeed can be 
tested with the help of the German panel data set.  
Consider a multinational with a parent firm in country H that owns a single affiliate 
in the destination country D. Country D taxes reported profits at rate tD. Country H is 
assumed to exempt foreign profits earned in country D, but taxes domestic profits (and any 
profits that are shifted into country H) at the rate tH. Since Germany uses an exemption 
system towards foreign dividends, this assumption is justified if we think of Germany as the 
home country H. In the case where Germany is acting as the host country (D) the assumption 
is obviously appropriate in the case of investing countries that also use an exemption system. 
If the investing country uses a credit system of taxation, then effective exemption still occurs 
if the parent in the home country is in an excessive credit position. An excessive credit 
position applies if the foreign taxes underlying the foreign dividends received by a parent 
are higher than the taxes that would apply had the parent earned the equivalent income at 
home. Since Germany is a high tax host country, such a situation is the norm and a credit 
system in the home country of the multinational may then be approximated by an exemption 
system.  
Let there be a level of "true" profits that would prevail in H and G in the absence of 
profit shifting activities (fH  ,  fD). The only decision variable of the multinational shall be the 
net amount S of profits that is shifted from D to country H. A negative amount of S then   6
indicates profit shifting into D. Shifting profits from a high tax jurisdiction to a low tax 
jurisdiction may save taxes but may also imply a cost for the multinational. For example, 
special activities may be necessary to hide the profit shifting. I assume that this cost is 
incurred by the plant that reduces its profitability. This assumption reflects that legal costs 
that arise when inadequate transfer prices are contested by minority shareholders or tax 
authorities will occur in the country where profits have been diminished.
6 That is, the cost 
cH(S) falls on the parent if the profit is shifting from the home country into D and cD(T,λ) is 
incurred by the affiliate if the shifting is out of the host country. Here λ denotes the fraction 
of shares of the host country affiliate that are held by other investors.
7 The respective cost is 
assumed to be convex in the absolute amount of shifting. 
If the shifting is from D to H, then the existence of other investors (who may resist 
the manipulations) makes profit shifting increasingly costly, while this is not the case if the 
other investors gain from profit shifting.
8 Therefore, cH, unlike cD, is taken to be independent 
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Global net of tax profits, which are assumed to form the objective function of the 
multinational, are given by 
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6 See Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004, p. 147-9) for a legal discussion of the corporate governance issues 
that arise when transfer pricing hurts minority shareholders.  
7 For simplicity, the fraction of ownership is assumed to be exogenously determined by firm characteristics.  
8 Co-ownership has been shown to be empirically important for the tax influence on related-party debt (Mintz 
and Weichenrieder 2005).   7
Differentiation of P w.r.t. S at S = 0 indicates that profit shifting from D to H (H to D) is 
profitable if  0 ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( < > − − − − D H t t λ   ) 1 /( ] [ ) ( λ λ − − < > ⇔ H D t t .
9 Since the cost of 
shifting profits depend on the direction of the profit manipulations, two cases have to be 
distinguished.  
 
Case A: Incentives to shift profits home. 
In this case  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − − D H t t λ  and the first order condition for optimal profit 
shifting is given by 
(3)  1 )] 1 )( 1 /[( ) 1 ( / ) , ( − − λ − − = ∂ λ ∂ D H D t t S S c . 
Using assumptions (1) and implicitly differentiating equation (3) yields the marginal 
effect of a change in tH on the amount of profit shifting: 
(4)  0 ²] / ) , ( ² ) 1 )( 1 /[( 1 d / d < ∂ λ ∂ ⋅ − λ − − = T S c t t S D D H . 
The effect of tH on S is as expected: the higher the foreign tax rate the smaller the 
optimal profit shifting S. The role of λ for the slope dS/dtH is less straightforward. A direct 
effect of a larger λ is a positive one: a higher share of co-owners increases the gain from any 
Euro that is shifted. But since  ² / ) , ( ² S S cD ∂ λ ∂  increases in λ, there is also a higher cost of 
shifting profits home and the net effect is unclear.  
The empirical parts of this paper will exploit information on the net of tax profits. 
Net-of-tax profits πD and πH in the model are defined by equation (2). Given the slope 
defined by equation (4), the reaction of the reported net of tax profit in D is may be rewritten 
as  
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9 Outside ownership has also been considered in the theoretical work by Kant (1988). The conflict of interest 
arising from transfer pricing and co-ownership has recently been emphasized by Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2004).    8
From equation (5), the predicted impact of an increase in  H t  is positive: ceteris paribus, a tax 
increase abroad should increase the profitability of a German affiliate. For the later empirical 
investigation it would be helpful to also have a clear testable prediction about the role of 
outside shareholders on the size of this tax effect. But, like in equation (4), the role of 
minority shareholders is ambiguous.  
Now consider the impact of a change in the tax rate tD on the reported profits πD. 
Again I start from the first order condition (3) to derive the tax rate effect. Differentiation 
w.r.t. tD yields:  
(6)  0 ²] / ) , ( ² ) 1 /[( ) / 1 ( d / d > ∂ λ ∂ ⋅ − ∂ ∂ + = S S c t S c t S D D D D . 
Since  S cD ∂ ∂ /   >  0 the slope is positive: a higher host country tax rate leads to 
additional profit shifting to the parent. Whether this slope should be expected to differ for 
subsidiaries with different λ is unclear. In equation (7), the first term of the numerator on the 
r.h.s. is positive, while the second part of the numerator is negative. 
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The effect of tD on net-of-tax profits can be derived as:  
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Clearly, the reported profits of the affiliate are expected to be a negative function of 
tD. The impact of λ on this slope is unclear for two reasons. First, the expression in equation 
(7), which re-enters if (8) is differentiated w.r.t. λ, cannot be signed. Second, it may be that 
the pre-tax profit () D D c S f − −  depends on λ.  
It is useful to summarize the results for Case A (S  > 0) in a non-technical 
proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: If the profit shifting incentives lead to an upward manipulation of 
home country profits and a downward manipulation of profits in the host country,   9
then an increase in the host (home) country tax rate should reduce (increase) reported 
profits of the foreign affiliate. It is theoretically unclear how co-ownership influences 
the magnitudes of these effects.  
 
Case B: Incentives to shift profits abroad. 
If the home country is a high tax country, then the incentives are to shift profits abroad (S < 
0) as long as co-ownership is limited:  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( < − − − − D H t t λ . The first order condition 
in this case is  0 ) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 / ) ( < − − λ − − = ∂ ∂ H D H t t S S c  and implicit differentiation yields: 
(9)  [ ] 0 ² / ) ( ² ) 1 ( / ) / ) ( 1 ( d / d < ∂ ∂ ⋅ − ∂ ∂ − − = S S c t S S c t S H H H H . 
As long as case B applies, an increase in the home country tax rate will make S more 
negative, i.e. it will increase profit shifting. Since cH is independent of λ, so is the slope 
dT/dtH. It is easy to verify, that if profits (fD – S) are independent of the co-ownership 
variable λ, then the marginal effect of tH on net-of-tax profits will also be independent of λ.  
  From the first order condition,  [ ] 0 ² / ) ( ² ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( d / d > ∂ ∂ ⋅ − λ − = S S c t t S H H D . Clearly, 
if the profit shifting incentives are such that profits are shifted into the affiliate, then an 
increased taxation of the affiliate will reduce this incentive and make S less negative. Unlike 
in Case A, the impact of λ can now be signed:  ( ) 0 d / d / d d < λ D t S . An increase in the co-
ownership abroad lowers the (absolute) marginal effect of a change in the host country tax. 
An intuition behind this is that a fraction of a tax decrease abroad is benefiting other 
shareholders of the affiliate, which makes this increase less effective for the decisions of the 
multinational. What are the implications for reported net of tax profitability? From the 
definition of the affiliate's net of tax profit and cD = 0 it follows:  
(10)  ( ) 0 ) / )( 1 ( d / d < ∂ ∂ − − − − = π D D D D D t S t S f t . 
When tD increases net-of-tax profits fall for two reasons. First, an increase in the tax rate 
reduces net profitability for a given amount of profit shifting. Second, profit shifting into the 
affiliate is reduced. Since net of tax profits, which will be the focus of the econometric   10
analysis, are reduced even in the absence of profit shifting it is important to have a testable 
hypothesis on how the slope in equation (10) depends on λ. If the profit (fD – S) of the 
affiliate is independent of co-ownership, then from  ( ) 0 d / d / d d < λ D t S  it follows that 
. 0 ) /( ² > λ ∂ ∂ π ∂ D D t  Increased co-ownership in this case would reduce the impact of tax rate 
changes on profitability. The above results may be summarized in a non-technical way as 
follows.  
 
PROPOSITION 2: If the profit shifting incentives lead to a downward manipulation 
of home country profits and an upward manipulation of profits in the host country, 
then an increase in the host (home) country tax rate should reduce (increase) reported 
net-of-tax profits of the foreign affiliate. Under the assumption that pre-tax profits 
are not dependent on co-ownership, co-ownership should reduce the effect of the 
host country tax rate on reported net of tax profitability.  
 
The two propositions of this section suggest an asymmetry in the effect that co-
ownership has on the amount of shifting. Given that the profit shifting benefits the affiliate, 
co-ownership is expected to limit the effect of a tax rate change in the host country on the 
amount of profit shifting. Intuitively, co-ownership makes this reaction to tax rate changes 
more expensive because co-owners participate in the increased profit. Conversely, co-
ownership does not necessarily dampen the effects of a tax rate increase in the home country 
of the parent if the profit shifting is benefiting the parent's profit: while co-ownership per se 
increases profit shifting incentives, it also implies a resistance to such behavior if it comes at 
a cost to co-owners.  
3. The data  
  German investors owning foreign affiliates are legally required to report on their 
foreign operations if it meets mild size and ownership requirements. Conversely, foreign-
controlled affiliates that operate in Germany have to report on these German operations. The   11
firm reports are the basis for the FDI database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (MiDi).
10 Most 
of the information in the data refers to a set of balance sheet items. On the liability side there 
is information on paid-up plus not paid-up equity, capital reserves, loss carry-forwards, 
current profits net of taxes, debt, liabilities to affiliated companies, and other liabilities. On 
the asset side, information is collected on fixed assets plus intangibles, financial assets 
(shares, loans), current assets, and other assets. Important non-balance-sheet items that are 
collected by the Bundesbank are sales and employees.  
  An unusual feature of the MiDi balance sheets is that they contain the yearly profit 
after taxes but before dividend distributions as a separate part of the equity of the firm. 
Therefore, the balance sheets provide information on profitability despite the fact that the 
database does not contain formal profit and loss statements.  
  Micro data on foreign direct investment are available for years since 1989 but firm 
identifiers that allow for the tracing of firms over time are available only from 1996 
onwards. Nevertheless, the ability to trace firms over up to 8 years is an important advantage 
over other data sources on FDI and can be used to avoid possible biases from cross-section 
estimates.  
For the purpose of this study, I dropped affiliates if these were either operating in 
not-for-profit sectors or were not incorporated. I also excluded affiliates in the banking and 
insurance industries and holding companies to avoid problems connected to the very 
different balance sheet structure of financial firms. On the outbound side, this results in 
117,254 firm-year observations during the period 1996-2003 and the data set includes 
10,855 (16,745) firms in 1996 (2003). On the inbound side, I have for the same time span 
55230 firm-year observations and 5791 (6988) firms in 1996 (2003).
11 Table 1 gives an 
                                                 
10 For a detailed description of MiDi see Lipponer (2003). Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) use the 
Bundesbank data to analyze the financial structure of German inward FDI and Mintz and Weichenrieder 
(2005) look at the financing of outward FDI. Buettner and Ruf (2004) use the database to study taxes and 
location decisions of German multinationals. 
11 I also dropped a limited number of observations for which we failed to collect reliable tax rate information 
on the home country (host country) if the affiliate was located in Germany (abroad). Finally, since the legally 
applied reporting thresholds varied between 1996 and 2003 I filtered the sample by imposing uniform size   12
impression of the total assets involved. The first two columns summarize the inbound side, 
while columns 3 and 4 inform about the magnitudes on the outbound side. In both cases I 
decided to follow the Bundesbank convention to separately account for directly and 
indirectly held affiliates. On the inbound side, the affiliate is indirectly held if the immediate 
investor is a foreign-owned intermediate company that is located in Germany. An affiliate is 
directly held if the immediate owner is a foreign investor. The definitions differ a bit on the 
outbound side. Here a German-owned foreign affiliate is defined as an indirectly held 
participation if the ownership chain contains at least one foreign company between the 
German investor and the foreign affiliate. This foreign intermediate company may or may 
not be in the country of the ultimate company. Conversely, the affiliate is directly held if no 
intermediate foreign company is used.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of German inbound and outbound FDI (2003) 
  Inbound FDI   Outbound FDI 
 Direct    Indirect  Direct  Indirect 
No. of affiliates  3,520  3,468  11,369  5,376 
Total assets (€ billion)  174  236  935  960 
Total assets, average  
(€ million)  
49.4 68.1 82.2  178.6 
 
  Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize the distribution of net-of-tax returns on total 
assets. Each of the four graphs contains 5 lines that represent the return on total assets 





th centile of firms. Again the categories "direct" and 
"indirect" are reported separately. Indeed, firms in these categories show a sizeable 
difference in ROA when it comes to inbound German FDI. Indirectly held firms have a 
lower spread in returns and more often show near zero profitability. If we look at a "near-
zero band" between -2.5% and +2.5% similar to Grubert, Goodspeed und Swenson (1993), 
                                                                                                                                                        
restrictions (total assets €3m for majority participations and €5.1m in the case of minority stakes) during this 
period.    13
we find that in 2003 from the total of all directly held affiliates (inbound) 36% fall in this 
range, while for the indirectly held firms it is even a majority of some 72%.
12  
Figure 1.Net-of-tax return on total assets: inbound FDI 




























1996 1998 2000 2002
Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the return on assets of the median non-financial firm. The 
two lines below the median line characterise the profitability of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two lines 
above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. The left hand diagram refers to the subsample of 
firms that are directly held by a foreign firm, while the graph on the right hand refers to firms in Germany that 
are foreign held via a German intermediate company. 
Figure 2. Net-of-tax return on total assets: outbound FDI  































1996 1998 2000 2002
Annotation: In each graph, the bold line indicates the return on assets of the median non-financial firm. The 
two lines below the median line characterise the profitability of the 5th and 25th centile firms, the two lines 
above the median ratio indicate the 75th and 95th centiles. The left hand diagram refers to the subsample of 
firms that are directly held by a German parent firm, while the graph on the right hand refer to firms that are 
held via a German-owned intermediate company outside Germany. 
The fact that this high fraction of firms with more or less zero profitability is pretty 
constant over the years may fuel the suspicion that advanced tax planning is the reason 
                                                 
12 Grubert, Goodspeed and Swenson use taxable profits (instead of net of tax profits) to total assets to define 
the band.    14
behind these figures. However, the high fraction of affiliates with zero profitability among 
indirectly held affiliates  at least partly results from specific data problems. While the 
Bundesbank requests firms to report profits net of taxes but before distributions, some 
indirectly held firms may fail to report profits that are transferred to the owner on the basis 
of a corporate contract. Under such a corporate contract the dependent company may agree 
to transfer all profits and losses to the upper-tier corporation in order to achieve profit and 
loss consolidation for tax purposes. Consolidation not only requires the existence of such a 
contract. Germany also restricts consolidation of profits and losses within a group to cases in 
which a German umbrella company is a majority owner of the dependent firm, i.e. an 
ownership chain is necessary to establish a profit transfer agreement. While the Bundesbank 
requires firms to report their profits before distribution, I found strong empirical evidence 
that many indirectly held firms report figures that are net of profit transfers to the umbrella 
company and therefore decided to drop indirectly held firms in the analysis of inbound FDI.  
Unlike the data for indirect inbound FDI, the profit data for German outbound investment 
presented in Figure 2 show no bunching at zero profitability and the reporting of zero 
profitability of indirectly held firms did only weakly correlate with the opportunity to 
consolidate profits in the relevant host country. For this reason, indirectly held firms were 
kept in the analysis of outbound investment. 
4. Profit shifting and the profitability of German inbound FDI  
Since during the observed period Germany is a high tax country by international 
comparison, the results derived for the case A (see Section 2, S > 0) are considered relevant 
for the profitability of inflowing FDI. According to Proposition 1, which assumes profitable 
multinationals, the foreign corporate tax rate in the country of the parent is then expected to 
positively affect the profitability of a German affiliate. Whether this effect should be 
expected to be larger for wholly-owned versus partly-owned affiliates  is unclear from 
Proposition 1.    15
To test these implications I use a subsample of incorporated non-financial firms in 
Germany that on average across all firm observations show a positive profitability. The 
endogenous variable is return on assets (ROA), where the return is measured by the net-of-
tax profits after interest payments (but before dividends). Because of the data problems 
discussed in Section 3, I concentrate on firms that are directly held by a foreign investor. 
Table 2 gives a summary statistics of this sample that contains 3788 firms that on average 
are observed over 4.7 years. Despite the fact that the sample is built by excluding firms that 
on average show non-positive profitability, the profitability measure shows a huge spread 
between -407 percent and 321 percent. To limit the impact of outliers I use a winsorized 
variable W_ROA that has been derived by setting the top and the lowest 5% of the 
observations to the 5
th and 95
th percentile of ROA, respectively. The average tax rate in the 
home country of the German affiliate is 34.7%.
13 WHOLLY is an indicator variable with 
value one if the foreign investor holds 100 percent of the German firm and zero otherwise. 
This variable is also used to create interactive variables. CT_WHOLLY takes on the value 
of the home country tax rate if the affiliate is wholly owned, and zero otherwise. 
Analogously, CTGER_WHOLLY results from multiplying the German corporate tax rate 
with the variable WHOLLY. DEBT_RATIO is defined as the ratio of debt to total assets that 
in some cases exceeds 100 percent. This can occur if the firm under consideration has loss 
carry forwards. To limit the impact of those outliers, the regressions use a winsorized 
variable, W_DEBT_RATIO. 
 
                                                 
13 On average, the parent firms of the German affiliates over the observed years experienced a maximum 
absolute change in the home country corporate tax rate of 4.4 percentage points. In cases in which investors 
from different countries own a German corporation I used the rate for the largest investor. The tax rate 
employed includes also average or representative local income taxes. It abstracts from tax base effects since 
optimal profit shifting decisions of profitable firms are independent of tax base effects.    16
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of German inbound sample (1996-2003) 
Variable Observations  Firms Average Std.deviation Min  Max
ROA 17671  3788 5.6% 12.8% -407.2%  321.1%
W_ROA 17671  3788 5.3% 7.1% -5.1%  23.0%
CT 17671  3788 34.7% 7.2% 0.0%  58.6%
WHOLLY 17671  3788 70.7% 45.6% 0  1
CT_WHOLLY 17671  3788 24.6% 17.0% 0.0%  58.6%
CTGER_WHOLLY 17671  3788 33.1% 22.4% 0.0%  56.8%
DEBT_RATIO 17671  3788 59.0% 30.6% 0.0%  512.4%
W_DEBT_RATIO 17671  3788 58.2% 26.8% 8.6%  98.2%
 
Since random effects models did not pass a Hausman test, the tax effects were 
estimated using a fixed effects model. Table 3 reports the regression results. The German tax 
rate could not be entered in the model as all firms are subject to the same rate in a given year 
and year fixed effects are also included. Model (1) starts with a parsimonious specification 
using the foreign tax rate, fixed firm and time effects, plus the logarithms of employment, 
sales, and fixed assets.
14 The variable of prime interest, CT, which measures the corporate 
tax rate of the foreign parent, turns out significant at the six percent level. The coefficient of 
0.049 implies that an increase in the tax rate of the parent by ten percentage points increases 
the return on assets of a German affiliate by approximately half a percentage point, which 
amounts to roughly ten percent of the average profitability in the sample. This evidence is in 
line with profit shifting behavior and Proposition 1. Employment does not enter 
significantly, while sales enter significantly positive. The size of fixed assets enters 
negatively, which may result from large depreciation allowances of investing firms. 
Model (2) uses the same specification but adds the variable W_DEBT_RATIO. Since 
additional debt increases the interest cost of an affiliate, the significant negative coefficient 
is in line with expectations. Inclusion of the debt ratio leads only to a small change in the 
coefficient of CT. By including the leverage variable the coefficient of CT measures the 
effect of the tax rate that prevailed when leverage was held constant. Therefore, changes in 
                                                 
14 To be precise, the value for fixed assets also includes intangible assets as these are compounded in the 
Bundesbank questionnaires.    17
the profit shifting activities that are induced by a change in CT seem to result only to a 
limited extent from the use of debt. This is in line with the previous observation that the 
parent tax rate does not significantly influence the leverage decision of foreign owned 
affiliates in Germany (Ramb and Weichenrieder 2005).  
Table 3: Foreign tax rate and domestic profitability 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
CT 0.049 0.044 0.065  0.052
 [0.06]* [0.09]* [0.05]*  [0.10]
CT_WHOLLY -0.025  -0.014
  [0.52] [0.71]
CTGER_WHOLLY 0.004  0.014
  [0.86] [0.52]
WHOLLY 0.014  0.005
  [0.32] [0.72]
LN_EMPLOYMENT -0.141 -0.143 -0.139  -0.142
 [0.76] [0.77] [0.77]  [0.77]
LN_SALES 1.206 1.315 1.222  1.329
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***  [0.00]***
LN_FIXEDASSETS -2.072 -0.994 -2.072  -0.997
 [0.00]*** [0.04]** [0.00]***  [0.04]**
W_DEBT_RATIO -0.155   -0.155
 [0.00]***   [0.00]***
Observations 17671 17671 17671  17671
Firms 3788 3788 3788  3788
adj. R-squared  0.52 0.58 0.52  0.58
Country clusters  51 51 51  51
 
Annotations: ***significant at 1%-level, **significant at 5%-level, *significant at 10%-level. P-values in 
brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within country cells and within firm cells). 
Dependent variable: W_ROA. All regressions contained a full set of time and firm fixed effects; coefficients 
are not reported. W_DEBT_RATIO and W_ROA have been winsorized. To avoid losing firms with zero 
employment, sales, or fixed assets in some year, I added a small constant before taking logs. For sake of 
presentation, logs have been entered in one tenth of a percent.  
According to Proposition 1, the effect of co-owners on the impact of a change in tax 
rates is unclear. Models (3) and (4) include variables that are constructed by interacting the 
German and the foreign tax rates with the dummy WHOLLY. The objective is to empirically 
investigate whether co-ownership matters for the size of the tax effects. The effect of 
ownership on the size of the tax effects turns out to be not only theoretically undetermined 
but also empirically insignificant. Finally, the insignificance of WHOLLY does not suggest 
that the net of tax profitability changes if firms have a change from partial to full ownership   18
by a foreign investor and this is confirmed by employing a formal F-test using all variables 
in which the variable WHOLLY is included (p-values are 36% and 54% in equations (3) and 
(4)).   
6. The profitability of German outbound FDI 
  I now turn to the outbound side of German FDI. Given the high German tax rates a 
major concern is that German multinationals have an incentive to shift profits abroad to 
repatriate these profits as a tax free dividend. This is a concern that corresponds to the Case 
B in Section 3.  
Of course a straightforward approach would be to test whether foreign taxes 
influence the pre-tax profitability of German owned foreign affiliates. The problem in doing 
so is that the Bundesbank database only contains net-of-tax profits. Therefore, it is 
impossible to identify whether a reduction in a foreign affiliate's observed return is due to a 
change in profit shifting activities or is simply caused by higher taxation at constant pre-tax 
earnings. However, there is another prediction of the model in Section 3 that indeed can be 
tested. If the incentives are to shift profits abroad, then, according to Proposition 2, co-
ownership should lead to a reduced impact of the foreign tax rate if co-ownership by itself 
has no impact on profitability. This contrasts with the case in which co-investors have an 
incentive to resist to profit shifting and the cost of profit shifting was assumed to increase in 
the amount of profit shifting.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of German outbound sample (1996-2003) 
Variable Observations  Firms Average Std.deviatio
n
Min Max
ROA  75,876 17,600 7.0% 17.  8% -210% 3699%
W_ROA  75,876 17,600 6.6% 7.5% -3.7% 25.1%
CT_WHOLLY 75,876  17,600 23.4% 16.3% 0  58.6%
CT 75,876  17,600 33.6% 7.8% 0  58.6%
CTGER_WHOLLY 75,876  17,600 32.0% 22.0% 0  56.8%
WHOLLY 75,876  17,600 0.70 0.46 0  1
W_DEBT_RATIO  75,876 17,600 51.2% 29.  8 0 1267%
   19
























Country clusters  68 68
Adj. R-squared  0.57 0.61
 
Annotations: ***significant at 1%-level, **significant at 5%-level, *significant at 10%-level. P-values in 
brackets are based on robust t-statistics (corrected for correlations within country cells and within firm cells). 
Dependent variable: W_ROA. All regressions contained a full set of time and firm fixed effects; coefficients 
are not reported. W_ROA and W_DEBT-RATIO are winsorized versions of ROW and DEBT-RATIO. To 
avoid losing firms with zero employment, sales, or fixed assets in some years, I added a small constant before 
taking logs. For sake of presentation, logs have been entered in one tenth of a percent. 
  
Like in Section 5, I concentrate on affiliates  that on average show a positive 
profitability. Table 4 gives the summary statistics for important variables. As on the inbound 
side, the return on total assets shows a huge variation that is obviously unrelated to taxation 
and the regressions below will therefore use the winsorized variable W_ROA. CT is now 
characterizing the corporate tax rate applicable to profits of the German-owned affiliate 
abroad. Using the dummy WHOLLY that takes on the value one if the German investor 
holds a 100% participation, I created the variable CT_WHOLLY = CT * WHOLLY in 
addition to using the simple host country corporate income tax, CT. Of course, the impact   20
CT is expected to be negative: an increased tax rate should reduce the net of tax profitability 
as long as a potentially accompanying tax base broadening does not overcompensate the 
effect of tax cuts.
15 Proposition 2 suggests that the coefficient of CT_WHOLLY should also 
be negative reflecting that firms without co-investors find it easier to adapt to tax rate 
changes than other firms.   
Table 5 contains two regression results using fixed effects models. While model (2) 
contains a variable for the leverage of the affiliate, model (1) omits such a variable. Apart 
from this, there are no differences in the specifications.  
Like in section 5, there is no evidence that the fact that a firm is wholly-owned 
correlates with profitability. The sign of CT is consistent with expectations: an increase in 
the tax rate of the host country reduces profitability. The coefficient is not significant, 
though, suggesting that a large fraction of the effects of rate reductions may be outweighed 
by accompanying tax base adjustments. The main variable of interest is CT_WHOLLY, 
which turns out to be negative and statistically significant at the 8 percent level in model (1). 
In line with Proposition 2, this suggests that wholly-owned firms indeed do react more 
strongly than co-owned affiliates.  
The German tax rate cannot be tested when time fixed effects are included as it is 
identical for all firms in a given year. The variable CTGER_WHOLLY measures the 
differential effect of the German tax rate for wholly owned affiliates as compared to non-
wholly owned subsidiaries. It shows a positive sign but is not significant at conventional 
levels. This is consistent with the model that has not suggested a systematic correlation.   
Unlike in the inbound sample, LN_EMPLOYMENT has a positive effect on 
profitability, while the control variables LN_SALES and LN_FIXEDASSETS have a 
corresponding sign: positive for sales and negative for the amount of fixed assets.
16 Finally, 
two variables are added that represent the macroeconomic situation in the host country. As a 
                                                 
15 I do not observe information on the tax base of foreign subsidiaries.  
16 Like on the inbound side, LN_FIXEDASSETS include intangible assets as these are compounded in the 
Bundesbank questionnaires.   21
measure of the local performance off the real economy, GDPGROWTH enters positively: 
affiliates  in high growth countries are enjoying a significantly higher return on assets. 
Besides real growth also the financial macroeconomic situation may affect profitability. 
DOMPRIVCRED, which measures the domestic private credit to GDP ratio and captures the 
liquidity of local loan markets, does not show up to be significant.  
If the negative coefficient of CT_WHOLLY is interpreted as evidence for profit 
shifting activities the question arises as to what extent this profit shifting may be due to a 
different financial structure. Since the dependent variable is a measure of the return on total 
assets, interest on additional debt, which an increased local tax rate may induce, will reduce 
profits and decrease this measure. Inclusion of a variable for the debt to asset ratio in model 
(2) should control for this latter effect. Indeed the inclusion of W_DEBT_RATIO decreases 
the impact of CT_WHOLLY and renders the estimated coefficient insignificant. This change 
suggests that some part of the profit reaction that is induced by a lower foreign tax rate CT 
results from a reduced leverage. These results are in line with the finding of Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2005) that the foreign tax rates significantly influences the intra-company 
loans granted by a German parent, but much less so if the foreign affiliate is co-owned by 
other investors. The estimated coefficient of -0.109 implies that an increase of the debt to 
asset ratio by one percentage point is associated with a reduction of the ROA by some 0.11 
percentage points.  
6. Summary  
The paper has taken two approaches to identify profit shifting behavior. In a first step, it has 
looked at the correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the net of tax 
profitability of its German affiliate. The finding is compatible with profit shifting behavior. 
For profitable affiliates the evidence suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the 
parent's home country tax rate leads to roughly half a percentage point increase in the 
profitability of the German affiliate.    22
  In a second step the paper has analyzed German outbound FDI. Given the high tax 
rates of German parents by international standards, the profitability of German-owned 
affiliates abroad may benefit from profit shifting. Since pre-tax profits are not observed in 
the German FDI data, the empirical test looks at whether the local tax rates of German-
owned affiliates have a stronger impact on wholly-owned affiliates. While such a differential 
effect seems to be present if leverage is excluded as an explanatory variable, the significance 
of the distinction between wholly-owned and partly-owned affiliates is blurred if leverage is 
entered in the regression.    23
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